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Abstract
Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and
in private values environments, for instance in ﬂower, ﬁsh, and tobacco auctions. In
this paper, we introduce ex post eﬃcient descending auctions for two environments:
multiple non-identical items and buyers with unit-demand valuations; and multiple
identical items and buyers with non-increasing marginal values. Our auctions are
designed using the notion of universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) prices and they
terminate with UCE prices, from which the Vickrey payments can be determined. For
the unit-demand setting, our auction maintains linear and anonymous prices. For the
homogeneous items setting, our auction maintains a single price and adopts Ausubel’s
notion of“clinching”to compute the ﬁnal payments dynamically. The auctions support
truthful bidding in an ex post Nash equilibrium and terminate with an ex post eﬃcient
allocation. In simulation, we illustrate the speed and elicitation advantages of these
auctions over their ascending price counterparts.
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11 Introduction
An iterative auction can be described as a monotonic price adjustment procedure that takes
bids from buyers in each iteration. Iterative auctions are often preferred over sealed-bid
auctions, even in private value environments. The most important reasons are those of
transparency, speed, and cost of participation (by avoiding the revelation of unnecessary val-
uation information through dynamic price discovery) (Cramton, 1998; Perry and Reny, 2005;
Compte and Jehiel, 2005). Most of the iterative auction design literature has focused on as-
cending price auctions (Demange et al., 1986; Gul and Stacchetti, 2000; Parkes and Ungar,
2000; Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2006; Ausubel, 2004; Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002; de Vries et al.,
2007; Mishra and Parkes, 2007). In comparison, there are few results on the design of de-
scending price auctions.1
Traditionally, in the descending price auction for a single item (called a Dutch auction),
the seller starts the auction from a very high price and iteratively lowers the price. The ﬁrst
buyer to accept the price wins the auction at that price. The use of such auctions is popular
because of its speed. Dutch auctions are used in selling ﬂowers in Netherlands (thus the name
Dutch auction) (van den Berg et al., 2001), ﬁsh in Israel, and tobacco in Canada. This type
of descending price auction is strategically equivalent to a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction and
we can expect demand reduction and ineﬃciency for asymmetric settings (Krishna, 2002).
Contrast this with the simple equilibrium bidding strategies and eﬃciency in ascending
price auctions such as the English auction, and its generalizations for multiple items (Demange et al.,
1986; Parkes and Ungar, 2000; Ausubel, 2004; Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002; Mishra and Parkes,
2007). In these auctions, under appropriate assumptions on valuations, it is an ex post Nash
equilibrium for a buyer to report his true demand set in every iteration; i.e., straightfor-
ward bidding is an equilibrium strategy whatever the private valuations of agents. The
auctions terminate with the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971;
Groves, 1973) outcome. Not only is this bidding strategy simple and robust to incorrect
agent beliefs, but it is an ex post eﬃcient equilibrium. One might ask whether there exists a
descending price auction counterpart of the English auction with such simple bidding as an
equilibrium strategy. The answer is“yes”, as noted by Vickrey in his seminal paper (Vickrey,
1961). For the single item setting, Vickrey points out that the Dutch auction can be modiﬁed
to run until a second buyer accepts an oﬀer and the ﬁrst buyer to accept an oﬀer wins but
pays the price at which the second oﬀer is accepted. Quoting Vickrey (1961):
“On the other hand, the Dutch auction scheme is capable of being modiﬁed
with advantage to a second-bid price basis, making it logically equivalent to the
second-price sealed-bid procedure ...”
1One exception is in the work of Mishra and Garg (2006), who propose a generalized Dutch auction
for one-to-one assignment setting, the setting in Demange et al. (1986), which terminates at the maximum
competitive equilibrium price (approximately) if buyers bid honestly. But, this work provides no game
theoretic equilibrium analysis.
2Then, he goes on to describe an apparatus that is commonly used to implement the Dutch
auction and how the same apparatus can be modiﬁed to implement this second-price auction.
Quoting Vickrey (1961) again:
“There would be no particular diﬃculty in modifying the apparatus so that the
ﬁrst button pushed would merely preselect the signal to be ﬂashed, but there
would be no overt indication until the second button is pushed, whereupon the
register would stop, indicating the price, and the signal would ﬂash, indicating
the purchaser.”
The appropriate method to extend Vickrey’s idea to more general environments appears to
be a puzzle in the current literature. For instance, in their work on the design of an ascending
price auction for the homogeneous items case, Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2006) observe the
following while interpreting their auction as a primal-dual algorithm:
“The primal-dual algorithm we describe starts at a low price where there is excess
demand. One could start the primal-dual algorithm at a high price at which there
would be excess supply, but it is unlikely that this would converge to a marginal
pricing equilibrium. 2”
In this paper we present generalized“Vickrey-Dutch”auctions for multi-unit and multi-item
environments that retain the speed and elicitation advantages that descending price auctions
can enjoy over ascending price auctions, while inheriting the robust and simple equilibrium
properties that come from termination at the Vickrey prices. The design of these auctions fol-
lows the methodology of universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) prices (Mishra and Parkes,
2007) to achieve the VCG outcome. Here we demonstrate, for the ﬁrst time, the role of UCE
prices in the design of auctions with simple prices.
Our Vickrey-Dutch auctions maintain a single price trajectory which can pass“through”
a part of the competitive equilibrium price space, before terminating at UCE prices. This
dynamics provides for enough demand revelation to realize the VCG outcome. Truthful
bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium strategy, providing robustness to the particular dis-
tribution of agent valuations. Our auctions reduce to Vickrey’s descending price auction
for the single-item environment, while generalizing Vickrey’s apparatus to the non-identical
item and multiple identical items environments.3
For the unit demand environment, the auction maintains a single set of item prices
and can be considered to provide the descending analog to the ascending price auctions of
2A marginal pricing equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium price where all buyers get their respective
payoﬀs in the VCG mechanism.
3After the ﬁrst version of this work, these Vickrey-Dutch auctions have been generalized to the case of
multiple heterogeneous items with buyers having combinatorial values in Mishra and Veeramani (2006). But
this Vickrey-Dutch auction maintains non-linear and non-anonymous prices and its price dynamics is more
complex than the Vickrey-Dutch auctions in the current paper. A possible future research direction is to
identify more valuation domains where simple price dynamics can be maintained in Vickrey-Dutch auctions.
3Demange et al. (1986). 4 For multiple identical items and non-increasing marginal valua-
tions (NIMV) we design a “clinching” auction, which provides a descending price analog to
the ascending price clinching auction of Ausubel (2004). Just as in Ausubel (2004), our
auction maintains a single price in each iteration, with the allocation and payments deter-
mined dynamically across iteration. The analysis of the auction establishes that the price
in any iteration when coupled with the history of clinching decisions up to that iteration
actually provides a concise representation of a non-linear and non-anonymous price vector
that terminates at UCE prices.
In completing this section, we will discuss the importance of descending price auctions
in some practical auction environments. The rest of the paper is then organized as follows.
In Section 2, we introduce our model and introduce the principles behind the design of our
Vickrey-Dutch auctions. The speciﬁc auctions, for the unit demand setting and the identical
items setting are presented in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5 we present simulation results to
illustrate the speed and elicitation-cost advantages that descending price auctions can enjoy
over ascending price auctions. We conclude with some future research directions.
1.1 Making the Case for Descending Price Auctions
It is commonly held that an ascending price format is important, in comparison with a
sealed-bid format, because it does not reveal the winner’s willingness to pay. The winning
bidder may prefer to keep this private when engaged in a long-term strategic interaction
with the seller, for instance, to avoid low prices in future periods. This can also limit any
“political”problems in second-price sealed-bid auctions, for instance when the price paid by
the winner is signiﬁcantly less than the willingness to pay (Rothkopf et al., 1990).
While providing new privacy for losing bidders, descending price auctions lose this advan-
tage for winning bidders over sealed bid auctions. However, we agree with Perry and Reny
(2005), Compte and Jehiel (2005), and Parkes (2005) that there is another more general
advantage that ascending price auctions often enjoy over sealed-bid auctions even in private
value environments. When participants face costly valuation problems then iterative auc-
tions can provide a signiﬁcant advantage, with price discovery guiding bidders in deciding
how to invest eﬀort in reﬁning their beliefs about their (private) valuations. Importantly, our
results show that descending price auctions can enjoy here a signiﬁcant further advantage.
The valuation problem faced by participants in an auction is often costly and time-
consuming. Participants in a ﬂower auction must determine their value for diﬀerent types
and quantities of ﬂowers. Participants in an FCC wireless auction must determine a new
business plan to determine the economic value of a particular spectrum allocation. Both
activities can require costly information acquisition as well as the cognitive attention of par-
ticipants. Price discovery in iterative auctions can guide a bidder to determine how accurate
4To be precise, our auction is a descending price analog of the variation on the auction in Demange et al.
(1986) presented in Sankaran (1994).
4he must determine his value for items and on which items to focus attention. In comparison,
sealed-bid auctions can require bidders to submit, and consequently determine, signiﬁcant
amounts of unnecessary information about their own valuations for diﬀerent allocations.5
Thus, iterative auctions can enjoy practical economic advantages over sealed-bid auctions
even in private-value settings.
In some environments descending price auctions can promote more eﬃcient preference
elicitation than ascending price auctions by completely avoiding unnecessary elicitation from
losing bidders. The cost is typically a small amount of additional elicitation from winning
bidders. As already noted in the introduction, descending price auctions can also have a
speed advantage over ascending price auctions and terminate after fewer rounds. This can
be important when auctioning time-sensitive goods. Descending price auctions also provide
less opportunity for collusion, an oft-cited reason for the failure of electronic auctions in
the supply chain (Elmaghraby, 2004), since there are less bids submitted and thus less
opportunity for bidders to communicate via bids.
We return now to the issue of providing privacy for winning bidders, which can be im-
portant both in markets with long-term strategic competition between participants and also
for political reasons in second-price auctions. Privacy goals can be addressed through or-
thogonal approaches to the design of the auction process, both technology and business
related. For instance, privacy can be provided in electronic auctions by using a trusted third
party to host the auction and private communication channels and also through crypto-
graphic methods. Trusted third parties are abundant in e-commerce, for instance eBay for
consumer-to-consumer auctions and companies such as Ariba, Emptoris and CombineNet for
business-to-business procurement auctions.6 Cryptographic technology, that uses computa-
tional hardness to also prove the correctness of an auction to participants while retaining
privacy (or even to securely implement an auction without even a trusted third party) can
also be adopted (Elkind and Lipmaa, 2004; Parkes et al., 2007).7
The simulation results that we present in Section 5 conﬁrm that there are reasonable
environments in which the Vickrey-Dutch auctions that we design enjoy both speed and
preference-elicitation properties that dominate those of ascending-price auctions. A simple
observation that emerges is that when the average clearing price on an item is above the me-
dian value on that item the descending auctions have better speed and elicitation properties
5The preference elicitation advantage is not necessarily true in the worst case. For instance, in the context
of iterative combinatorial auctions, Nisan and Segal (2006) construct valuations for which the worst-case
communication eﬃciency of ascending price auctions is equal to that of sealed-bid auctions.
6Furthermore, as supply chain relationships become more collaborative it is increasingly common for the
winning ﬁrms in reverse auctions to share information about their cost base in order to work collaboratively in
achieving further cost reductions and process improvements. From this perspective, it seems more desirable
that the costs of winners be revealed than the costs of losing bidders.
7There remains an advantage for ascending-price auctions over descending-price auctions in interdependent
valuation environments in which the private information of buyers can inﬂuence the valuation of other
buyers (Perry and Reny, 2005). We emphasize that we study fully private-value environments and accept
this restriction in return for the improved speed and elicitation properties of descending price auctions.
5than the ascending auctions.
2 The Model and Preliminaries
To begin we introduce a general model with n heterogeneous indivisible items. In a later
section we specialize this model and consider n identical items. We deﬁne competitive
equilibrium and universal competitive equilibrium prices in this model and provide a general
framework for the design of iterative VCG auctions.
The set of items is denoted by A = {1,...,n}. There are m (≥ 2) buyers, denoted by
B = {1,...,m}. The set of all bundles of items is denoted by Ω = {S ⊆ A}. Naturally,
∅ ∈ Ω. For every buyer i ∈ B and every bundle S ∈ Ω, the valuation of i on bundle S is
denoted by vi(S) ≥ 0, assumed to be a non-negative integer. If S is a singleton, we write
vi(j) instead of vi({j}) for simplicity.
We assume a private values setting where each buyer knows his own valuation function
and it does not depend on the valuations or allocations of other buyers. The payoﬀ of any
buyer i ∈ B on any bundle S ∈ Ω is given by vi(S) − p, where p is the price paid by buyer
i on bundle S. Also, if a buyer gets nothing and pays nothing, then his utility is zero:
vi(∅) := 0 ∀ i ∈ B. We also assume that vi(S) ≤ vi(T) ∀ i ∈ B, ∀ S,T ∈ Ω with S ⊆ T.
The seller values the items at zero. His payoﬀ (or revenue) is the total payment he receives
from buyers.
Let B−i = B \{i} be the set of buyers without buyer i. Let B = {B,B−1,...,B−m}. We
will denote the economy with buyers only from set M ⊆ B as E(M). Whenever, M  = B
and M ∈ B, we call economy E(M) a marginal economy. E(B) is called the main economy.
Let x denote a feasible allocation in economy E(M) (M ∈ B). Allocation x is both a
partitioning of the set of items and an assignment of the elements of the partition to buyers
in M. Allocation x assigns bundle xi to buyer i for every i ∈ M and for every i  = j,
xi ∩ xj = ∅. The possibility of xi = ∅ is allowed. We will denote the set of all feasible
allocations of economy E(M) as F(M).
An allocation X is eﬃcient in economy E(M) if there does not exist another allocation
y ∈ F(M) such that
P
i∈M vi(yi) >
P
i∈M vi(xi).
Consider general prices, that can be both non-linear and non-anonymous, and deﬁne the
demand set of buyer i ∈ M (for some M ∈ B) at price vector p ∈ R
|M|×|Ω|
+ as
Di(p) :=
￿
S ∈ Ω : vi(S) − pi(S) ≥ vi(T) − pi(T) ∀ T ∈ Ω
￿
and the supply set of the seller at price vector p ∈ R
|M|×|Ω|
+ in economy E(M) as
L(p) :=
￿
x ∈ F(M) :
X
i∈M
pi(xi) ≥
X
i∈M
pi(yi) ∀ y ∈ F(M)
￿
.
Deﬁne πs(p) :=
P
i∈M pi(xi), where x ∈ L(p), as the revenue of the seller at price vector
p ∈ R
|M|×|Ω|
+ in economy E(M).
6Deﬁnition 1 Price vector p ∈ R
|M|×|Ω|
+ and allocation x are a competitive equilibrium
(CE) of economy E(M) for some M ⊆ B if x ∈ L(p), and xi ∈ Di(p) for every buyer i ∈ M.
Price p is called a CE price vector of economy E(M).
If p ∈ R
|B|×|Ω|
+ , then the components of p corresponding to a set of buyers M ⊂ B will be
denoted as pM (or, p−i if M = B−i). A component of pM will still be denoted as pi( ) for
every i ∈ M.
Deﬁnition 2 A price vector p is a universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) price
vector if pM is a CE price vector of economy E(M) for every M ∈ B.
A UCE price vector always exists since p := v is a (trivial) UCE price vector. Mishra and Parkes
(2007) showed that UCE prices are powerful tools for designing ascending price Vickrey auc-
tions. Speciﬁcally, UCE prices are necessary and suﬃcient to realize the VCG outcome from
a CE of the main economy, as shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 ((Mishra and Parkes, 2007)) Let (p,x) be a CE of the main economy with
p ∈ R
|B|×|Ω|
+ . The VCG payments of every buyer can be calculated from (p,x) if and only if
p is a UCE price vector. Moreover, if p is a UCE price vector, then for every buyer i ∈ B,
the VCG payment of every buyer i ∈ B is p
vcg
i = pi(xi) − [πs(p) − πs(p−i)].
The above result will be suﬃcient for our purposes because our auctions terminate with
UCE prices. Lahaie et al. (2005) provide a more general result, that establishes that UCE
prices are necessarily determined in any iterative mechanism (whether price-based or other-
wise) that also determines the VCG outcome.
2.1 The Design of Vickrey-Dutch Auctions
The underlying idea behind the design of most ascending price auctions is that prices are
increased in each iteration in response to demand sets collected from bidders, until the
auction terminates with CE prices.
It is typical to stop at the ﬁrst such price vector and design the auction such that this
price vector is buyer optimal across all CE prices. This allows one to design ex post eﬃcient
ascending price auctions for restricted classes of valuations, those in which these buyer-
optimal CE prices equal VCG payments (Demange et al., 1986; Bikhchandani and Ostroy,
2006; Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002; de Vries et al., 2007).
Contrast this with a descending price auction for a single item, the so-called Dutch
auction. It stops as soon as a buyer agrees to buy the item. If buyers bid truthfully, this
terminating condition can be interpreted as “stop when a CE price is reached”. But this
CE price, the maximum possible CE price in this setting, does not correspond to payments
in the VCG outcome. A similar situation arises in more general settings. For example,
Mishra and Garg (2006) show that a generalization of the Dutch auction for the unit demand
setting terminates at the unique maximum CE price vector under truthful bidding.
7In fact, a similar diﬃculty exists in ascending price auctions for general valuations when
no CE price vector corresponds to the VCG payments of buyers (de Vries et al., 2007).
Mishra and Parkes (2007) overcome this diﬃculty by searching for a UCE price vector from
which ﬁnal VCG payments are determined as an adjustment upon termination. This adjust-
ment implements discount (πs(p) − πs(p−i) to every winner. The same method will be used
for the design of Vickrey-Dutch auctions.
We state a general theorem about the equilibrium properties of iterative Vickrey auc-
tions. Similar results appear in earlier work (Mishra and Parkes, 2007; de Vries et al., 2007;
Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2006). The proof is omitted because it follows immediately from
the dominant-strategy incentive compatibility properties of the VCG mechanism. A buyer
bids truthfully if he submits true demands sets in each iteration, and follows a straightforward
strategy with respect to (possibly untruthful) valuation ˆ v if the buyer submits demand sets
that are consistent with some valuation ˆ v:
Theorem 2 Consider an iterative (ascending or descending) auction that satisﬁes the fol-
lowing conditions, for all valuations v,
a) If every buyer bids truthfully then the auction terminates at a UCE price vector and
achieves the VCG outcome.
b) If every buyer except i follows a straightforward strategy, then every feasible strategy
available to buyer i is equivalent to some straightforward strategy with respect to some
valuation ˆ vi, perhaps not his true valuation.
Such an iterative auction has truthful bidding in an ex post Nash equilibrium.
Condition (b) in Theorem 2 can typically be met in an iterative auction by imposing
activity rules (Mishra and Parkes, 2007, e.g.).
The search for a UCE price vector in a descending price auction is very diﬀerent than
in an ascending price auction, and it is not a trivial exercise to design a Vickrey-Dutch
auction. One starts from high prices where demand is less than supply and lowers prices
until supply and demand balance in all economies. This is in contrast to an ascending price
auction where prices are initially low, creating higher demand than supply, and prices are
adjusted upwards to match supply and demand in all economies. In many settings, ascending
price auctions can achieve UCE prices by adjusting prices until supply equals demand in
the main economy because this will often times also balance supply and demand in every
marginal economy Demange et al. (1986); Ausubel (2004). This is not true for descending
price auctions, even for the single item case.
3 The Unit Demand Environment
In this section we introduce a Vickrey-Dutch auction for the environment with heterogeneous,
indivisible items and unit-demand valuations so that each buyer is interested in buying
8at most one item. This is the standard assignment problem. Our auction maintains an
individual price on each item and decreases prices until supply balances demand in the main
economy and also in all marginal economies.
For convenience, we will assume that there is a dummy item, indexed 0, available such
that the value of the dummy item is zero for all buyers, and the dummy item can be allocated
to any number of buyers. A feasible allocation x assigns to every buyer i ∈ B either an item
j ∈ A or the dummy item. No item is assigned more than once (but an item may be
unassigned). Let xi denote the item assigned to buyer i in allocation x.
Let vi(j) denote buyer i’s value for item j ∈ A. A price vector p denotes linear and
anonymous prices with p ∈ R
n+1
+ and p(0) = 0. The deﬁnition of demand set is modiﬁed
to restrict to include only singleton bundles, with Di(p) = {j ∈ A ∪ {0} : vi(j) − p(j) ≥
maxj′∈A∪{0}[vi(j′) − p(j′)]}, and the deﬁnition of CE is specialized as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 Price vector p ∈ R
n+1
+ is a competitive equilibrium price vector if there
exists an allocation x such that xi ∈ Di(p) for every i ∈ B and p(j) = 0 for every item j
that is not assigned in x.
If (p,x) is a CE in the assignment problem, then x is an eﬃcient allocation(Gul and Stacchetti,
1999). The set of CE price vectors in this unit demand setting form a complete lat-
tice (Shapley and Shubik, 1972), that is there is a unique minimum and a unique maxi-
mum CE price vector. Moreover, the minimum CE price vector corresponds to the VCG
payments (Leonard, 1983). We obtain the following simple but useful observation:
Proposition 1 There is a unique linear and anonymous UCE price vector in the unit-
demand environment, and this is equal to the minimum CE price vector and deﬁnes the
VCG payments.
Proof: If the UCE price vector p is anonymous then the revenue of the seller in the main
economy, πs(p) and in any marginal economy πs(p−i), is equal because p = p−i. This
means that the discounts to buyers in Theorem 1 are all zero and that the CE prices on the
eﬃcient allocation already correspond to the VCG payments. Leonard (1983) shows that
the minimum CE price vector is one such CE price vector and from the lattice result in
(Shapley and Shubik, 1972) this is unique. ￿
This observation means that searching for UCE prices will directly (without any discount)
give the VCG outcome. To illustrate Proposition 1, consider the following example with
two buyers {1,2} and two items {1,2}. Valuations are: v11 = 8, v12 = 4, v21 = 6, v22 = 3.
It is easy to verify that the minimum CE price vector is (3,0), which also gives every buyer
his VCG payoﬀ (5 for buyer 1 and 3 for buyer 2). It can be easily veriﬁed that (3,0) is a
UCE price vector (item 1 is allocated to the remaining buyer in both marginal economies.)
Any other CE price vector in this example will reduce the payoﬀ of at least one buyer below
his VCG payoﬀ, and it is not a UCE price vector because p(2) > 0 and the seller will still
want to sell both items in each marginal economy.
93.1 The Vickrey-Dutch Auction (Unit-Demand Environment)
In every iteration, the auctioneer reports prices pt ∈ R
n+1
+ and receives demands from each
buyer. Let D(pt) = {Di(pt)}i∈B and D−i(pt) = {Dk(pt)}k∈B−i denote the vector of demand
sets received in iteration t from buyers in B and in B−i respectively.
Given an allocation x, the revenue is the sum of prices of all the items allocated. A
buyer i is satisﬁed in an allocation x at price vector p if xi ∈ Di(p). An admissible allocation
at a price vector is an allocation that allocates to every buyer either the dummy item or
exactly one item from his demand set. A provisional allocation is an admissible allocation
that generates the maximum revenue across all admissible allocations, breaking ties in favor
of satisfying the maximum number of buyers and then at random. Let X(D(pt)) denote
the set of provisional allocations at price vector pt and let X(D−i(pt)) denote the set of
provisional allocations for economy E(B−i). Given an allocation x, let S(x) ⊆ A denote the
set of allocated items with positive prices.
The following concept plays a central role in deﬁning the auction:
Deﬁnition 4 Item j ∈ A is universally allocated, written j ∈ U(p,D(p),x) given a price
vector p, demand sets D(p), and provisional allocation x ∈ X(D(pt)), if p(j) = 0 or item j
is provisionally allocated to some buyer i with S(x) = S(y) for some y ∈ X(D−i(p)).
A universally allocated item j should either have a price of zero or be provisionally
allocated to some buyer i such that all items with positive prices (including item j) that are
allocated can also be allocated in the marginal economy without buyer i given the current
demand. We give two examples in Section 3.2 to illustrate the idea.
The Vickrey-Dutch auction in this environment seeks prices for which all items are uni-
versally allocated and reduces prices on items that are not universally allocated until this is
achieved. The ﬁnal prices are UCE prices by deﬁnition of universal allocation. We refer to
the auction as the linear-price Vickrey-Dutch (LVD) auction:
Deﬁnition 5 The linear-price Vickrey-Dutch (LVD) auction for the unit demand en-
vironment is deﬁned as follows:
(S0) Start from a high price p0 where no buyer demands any item from A. Set t := 0.
(S1) In iteration t of the auction, with price vector pt:
(S1.1) Collect the demand sets D(pt) of all the buyers at pt.
(S1.2) Based on the demand sets of buyers at pt, calculate a provisional allocation xt ∈
X(D(pt)).
(S1.3) Find the universally allocated set of items, U(pt,D(pt),xt).
(S1.4) If U(pt,D(pt),xt) = A (the set of all items), go to Step (S2). Else, set pt+1(j) :=
pt(j) − 1 ∀ j ∈ (A \ U(pt,D(pt),xt)). Set t := t + 1 and repeat from Step (S1).
10(S2) The auction terminates in current iteration T with price vector pT and the provisional
allocation xT. If xT
i = j for buyer i, then he pays an amount pT(j) and gets item j.
The problem of ﬁnding a provisional allocation xt ∈ X(D(pt)) is a variant on the stan-
dard assignment problem.8 We will now provide a computationally eﬃcient procedure to
determine the set of universally allocated items. This is used both to adjust prices and also
to check for termination.
3.2 Identifying Universally Allocated Items
Consider the examples in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), which illustrate demand sets and an allo-
cation at two diﬀerent price vectors. Suppose all prices are positive. A solid line between
a buyer and an item means that the buyer is provisionally allocated to the item. A dashed
line between a buyer and an item means that the buyer has an item in his demand set but is
not provisionally allocated to the item. Each ﬁgure represents all the information required
to determine the set of universally allocated items.
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Figure 1: Identifying universally allocated items. Dashed line: item in demand set but not
provisionally allocated. Solid line: provisional allocation. All prices are positive.
In Figure 1(a), item 3 is universally allocated: remove buyer 3 (provisionally allocated to
item 3), then allocate buyer 4 to item 3 without changing the total set of allocated items.
But, no other items are universally allocated. In case of item 1, if we remove buyer 1, the only
buyer that demands item 1 is buyer 2 and thus we cannot allocate item 1 without reducing
the total set of provisionally allocated items. Item 2 is also not universally allocated, by
symmetry. In Figure 1(b), all 3 items are universally allocated. Buyer 4 will take buyer 3’s
item. Without buyer 1 (allocated to item 1), we can allocate buyer 4 to item 3 and buyer 3
8It can be solved with two linear programs (LPs). The ﬁrst LP computes an admissible allocation that
maximizes total revenue given demand sets D(pt). A second LP is then formulated to break ties in favor of
maximizing the number of satisﬁed buyers, with the objective deﬁned as such and a constraint included to
ensure that the revenue from the allocation is equal to that obtained in solving the ﬁrst LP.
11to item 1 without changing the total set of allocated items. Without buyer 2, we can allocate
buyer 4 to item 3, buyer 3 to item 1 and buyer 1 to item 2.
It is instructive that item 3, which is demanded by an unallocated buyer (4), is a univer-
sally allocated item and the starting point for ﬁnding other universally allocated items. We
use this idea to develop a procedure to determine the set of universally allocated items.
We ﬁrst handle items with zero price. Given (p,D(p),x), let (p′,D′(p′),x′) denote the
restriction to items with positive price, with p′ = (p(j) : j ∈ A,p(j) > 0), D′
i(p′) = {j :
j ∈ Di(p),p(j) > 0}, and x′
i = xi when p(xi) > 0 and x′
i = 0 otherwise. Let A0(p) = {j ∈
A,p(j) = 0} denote the items with zero price.
Lemma 1 U(p,D(p),x) = U(p′,D′(p′),x′) ∪A0(p) where (p′,D′(p′),x′) is the restriction of
(p,D(p),x) to items with positive price and A0(p) is the set of items with zero price.
Proof: To show U(p,D(p),x) ⊇ U(p′,D′(p′),x′)∪A0(p), if j ∈ A0(p) then j ∈ U(p,D(p),x)
by deﬁnition. If j ∈ U(p′,D′(p′),x′) then j is allocated in x′ and thus also in x, and moreover
there is some y′ ∈ X(D′
−i(p′)) (where j is allocated to i in x) with S(y′) = S(x′). Now,
consider z ∈ X(D−i(p)). Clearly, S(z) = S(y′) because z must allocate as many items with
positive price as y′ for it to be a provisional allocation. Since S(y′) = S(x′) = S(x), we have
S(z) = S(x).
To show U(p′,D′(p′),x′) ∪ A0(p) ⊇ U(p,D(p),x), consider j ∈ U(p,D(p),x). If p(j) =
0 then j ∈ A0(p). If p(j)  = 0 then j is allocated in x, to say i. Then, there is some
y ∈ X(D−i(p)) with S(y) = S(x). Construct y′ ∈ X(D′
−i(p′)) with S(y′) = S(x′) = S(x)
by assigning the dummy item to any agent k  = i allocated to an item with zero price in
allocation y. Thus, item j ∈ U(p′,D−i(p′),x′). ￿
We now formalize the intuition in the example, in which we identiﬁed a sequence of
reassignments of items, starting with a currently unallocated buyer. Given allocation x, let
a well-deﬁned chain with respect to buyer i, allocated to item j in x, be z−i(x,D(p)) =
j0i1j1 ...icjc, with c ≥ 1 (this is a sequence of alternating buyers and items) and with the
property that:
(i) item j0 = 0 and item jc = j
(ii) buyer ir, for 1 ≤ r ≤ c is assigned item jr−1 in allocation x
(iii) buyer i / ∈ {i1,...,ic}
(iv) item jr ∈ Dir(p) for all 1 ≤ r ≤ c
Such a chain deﬁnes a reassignment of items, with a modiﬁed allocation x′ deﬁned with
x′
ir = jr for all r ∈ {1,...,c}, x′
k = xk for all k / ∈ {i1,...,ic} ∪ {i}, and x′
i = 0.
Lemma 2 Given a price vector p with non-zero prices for all the items, item j ∈ U(p,D(p),x)
if and only if there is a well-deﬁned chain z−i(x,D(p)) = j0i1j1i2j2 ...icj where buyer i is
allocated j in allocation x.
Proof: Given such a chain z−i(x,D(p)), the modiﬁed allocation x′ induced by the chain
when applied to x satisﬁes x′ ∈ X(D−i(p)) and S(x′) = S(x) by deﬁnition. Now, consider
12some j ∈ U(p,D(p),x). We construct a well-deﬁned chain z−i(x,D(p)), where i is the buyer
assigned j in x. Consider allocation y ∈ X(D−i(p)) with S(y) = S(x). Let i(1) denote the
buyer assigned to j in y (such a buyer must exist). Let j(1) denote the item assigned to buyer
i(1) in x. If j(1) = 0 then the chain is 0i(1)j. Otherwise, let i(2) denote the buyer assigned
to j(1) in y and let j(2) denote the item assigned to this buyer in x. Now, if j(2) = 0 then
the chain is 0i(2)j(1)i(1)j. Eventually, for some q ≤ n there must be a buyer i(q) assigned
item j(q−1) in y but unallocated in x and this completes the chain 0i(q)j(q−1) ...i(1)j. Such
a buyer must exist because y must allocate to at least one buyer not allocated in x since
S(y) = S(x). ￿
In Figure 1(a) the well-deﬁned chain that explains item 3 is j0i1j1 = 043. In Figure 1(b)
the well-deﬁned chain that explains item 1 is 04331 and the chain that explains item 2 is
0433112.
Let ˆ U(p,D(p),x) = {j′ ∈ A : j′ ∈ D′
i(p′) for some i ∈ B with x′
i = 0}, where
(p′,D′(p′),x′) is the restriction of (p,D(p),x) to positive prices. We can determine the
set of universally allocated items U(p,D(p),x) as follows.
Procedure: UAI
Step 0: Initialize U(0)(p,D(p),x) = ˆ U(p,D(p),x). Set r := 1.
Step 1: Let T (r) denote the set of buyers allocated to items in U(r−1)(p,D(p),x)
Step 2: Let W (r) =
S
i∈T(r)
Di(p) ∩ S(x) denote the set of provisionally
allocated items with positive price demanded by buyers in T (r).
Step 3: If W (r) ⊆ U(r−1)(p,D(p),x), output U(r−1)(p,D(p),x) ∪ A0(p) and STOP.
Else, U(r)(p,D(p),x) := U(r−1)(p,D(p),x) ∪ W (r). r := r + 1.
Repeat from Step 1.
As an illustration, we apply the UAI algorithm to the example in Figure 1(b). In the
ﬁrst round of the UAI algorithm, set U(p,D(p),x) = {3}. This gives T = {3} and W =
{1,3}. We update U(p,D(p),x) = {1,3}. Now, T = {1,3} and W = {1,2,3}. We update
U(p,D(p),x) = {1,2,3}. Now, T = {1,2,3} and W = {1,2,3} and we stop because
W = U(p,D(p),x).
Proposition 2 The UAI procedure determines all universally allocated items.
Proof: Each repetition of steps 1–3 in procedure UAI is referred to as a round, indexed
r = 1,2,.... By Lemma 1 we can reduce the problem of determining the set of universally
allocated items to that of ﬁnding the set U(p′,D′(p′),x′) where (p′,D′(p′),x′) is restricted to
items with positive prices. For these, we know from Lemma 2 that an item j is universally
allocated if and only if there is a well-deﬁned chain, starting from an unallocated agent
in x′ and terminating with the item j. The UAI procedure completes the closure of all
13items reachable by any well-deﬁned chain, ﬁrst initializing U(p,D(p),x) to the set of items
demanded by an agent unallocated in x′ (and thus reachable by a chain of length 1), and
then in each round r = 1,2,... identifying all allocated items W reachable by some chain
of length r + 1. The items with zero price A0(p) are ﬁnally added to the set of universally
allocated items. ￿
Every round of the UAI procedure either ﬁnds new universally allocated items or stops,
and thus the maximum number of rounds of the UAI algorithm is n, the total number of
items. The computations in each round can be done in polynomial time, and therefore the
UAI algorithm runs in polynomial time.9
3.3 Theoretical Analysis
When designing ascending price auctions it is common to construct a price trajectory such
that the seller is satisﬁed in every iteration and the buyers are all satisﬁed upon termination.
Our analysis of the LVD auction will establish the reverse for descending price auctions:
every buyer is satisﬁed with the provisional allocation in every iteration and the seller is
satisﬁed upon termination.
Proposition 3 In the provisional allocation in every iteration of the LVD auction, every
buyer is satisﬁed under truthful bidding.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the iteration t ≥ 0 of the auction. The base case is
easy because every buyer demands only the dummy item. Now, suppose the claim holds
in iteration t − 1 and consider iteration t > 0. Let xt−1 ∈ X(D(pt−1)). By assumption all
buyers are satisﬁed in xt−1.
We will ﬁrst show that xt−1 remains admissible, so that every buyer is still satisﬁed with
provisional allocation xt−1 in iteration t.
Case 1: Buyer i is unallocated in iteration t − 1. Since i is satisﬁed, 0 ∈ Di(pt−1) and
for all j ∈ Di(pt−1)\{0} then j is universally allocated in iteration t−1 by Lemma 2. Thus,
the price is unchanged in iteration t on all items in the demand set of i, while the price falls
by at most 1 on all other items. This implies Di(pt) ⊇ Di(pt−1).
Case 2: Buyer i is allocated item j  = 0, but j is not universally allocated in iteration
t − 1. Thus, the price on this item falls in iteration t and since the price on no other item
falls by more than this, j ∈ Di(pt).
Case 3: Buyer i is allocated item j  = 0 that is universally allocated. We show that for
every j′ ∈ Di(pt−1), we have j′ ∈ U(pt−1,D(pt−1),xt−1). Consider the interesting case that
9Contrast this with ﬁnding a minimal set of over-demanded items that is needed to be computed in each
iteration of the ascending-price auction in Demange et al. (1986). A naive algorithm will require verifying the
condition for over-demanded items for exponential number of bundles of items in the worst case. Sankaran
(1994) observed this and introduced a modiﬁed price adjustment that is computationally feasible and provides
an auction with the same theoretical properties.
14pt−1(j′) > 0 and suppose that j′ is not allocated in xt−1. But, the auction could have then
achieved more revenue in iteration t−1 with allocation y ∈ D−i(pt−1) such that S(y) = S(x)
(which exists since j is universally allocated) and then augmenting allocation y to assign
item j′ to agent i. Thus, this would contradict with xt−1 being a provisional allocation. Now
consider the chain z−i(xt−1,D(pt−1) = 0i1j1 ...icj that establishes that item j is universally
allocated. If buyer i′, allocated to item j′ in xt−1, is not represented in the chain then the
well-deﬁned chain 0i1j1 ...icjij′ establishes that j′ is also universally allocated. On the other
hand, if i′ is in the chain, for instance z−i(xt−1,D(pt−1)) = 0i1j1i2j′i′j3 ...icj then consider
truncated chain 0i1j1i2j′ which is well-deﬁned for z−i′(xt−1,D(pt−1)) and establishes that j′
is universally allocated. Since all items in Di(pt−1) are universally allocated, the price of
every item remains unchanged in pt while the price on other items falls by at most 1 on any
other item. This implies Di(pt) ⊇ Di(pt−1).
Second, we show that a provisional allocation xt exists in iteration t that satisﬁes every
buyer. We provide a sequence of transformations to construct such a provisional allocation
from any provisional allocation ˆ xt in iteration t (i.e. ˆ xt may assign the dummy item to some
agents that do not have it in their demand sets). Initialize B(0) to the set of buyers not
satisﬁed in ˆ xt and initialize A(0) = ∅, to denote the set of items whose assignment is ﬁxed.
Pick any i ∈ B(0) and consider item j allocated to i in xt−1. By the above reasoning we
know that j ∈ Di(pt), and thus we construct admissible allocation x(1) by assigning item j
to buyer i and assigning the buyer assigned to j in ˆ xt to the dummy item. Set A(1) = {j} to
indicate that the allocation of item j is now ﬁxed. The revenue achieved by the seller in x(1)
is the same as in x(0). Deﬁne B(1) as the buyers not satisﬁed in allocation x(1). Continue,
picking a buyer i ∈ B(1), ﬁxing the allocation of another item, and so on. Since this process
assigns buyers to their assignments in xt−1, eventually an admissible allocation is achieved
with the same revenue as ˆ xt that satisﬁes every buyer. ￿
Next, we show that the LVD auction terminates at the unique UCE price vector and
consequently the minimum CE price vector, and therefore collects the VCG payment.
Proposition 4 The LVD auction terminates at the minimum CE price vector when every
buyer follows the truthful bidding strategy.
Proof: The price is reduced on at least one item with positive price in each iteration and
thus the auction must terminate since any item with zero price is universally allocated. Upon
termination, every item is universally allocated and thus every item with positive price is
allocated and the allocation is in the supply set of the seller. Taken together with every buyer
being satisﬁed (Proposition 3) we see that the ﬁnal prices and the ﬁnal provisional allocation
are a CE. We will next show that the ﬁnal price vector, pT, is a UCE price vector. Consider a
buyer i. Let xT
i = j. If j = 0, then clearly (pT,xT
−i) is a CE of the marginal economy without
buyer i. If j  = 0, then because this item is universally allocated there exists an allocation
yT ∈ X(D−i(pT)) such that all items with positive price are allocated (and so it is in the
supply set), and all the buyers except i are satisﬁed. This is because of Lemma 2, wherein
15the well-deﬁned chain shows that upon moving from allocation xT to allocation yT, that any
agent  = i allocated a non-dummy item in xT is still allocated a non-dummy item in yT. One
additional buyer, unallocated (but satisﬁed) in xT is now also allocated a non-dummy item
in yT. Hence, (pT,yT) is a CE in the marginal economy without buyer i. This shows that
pT is a UCE price vector, and thus the minimum CE price vector by Proposition 1. ￿
For truthful bidding to be an ex post Nash equilibrium it is suﬃcient to ensure that
the only feasible strategy available to a bidder is to bid straightforwardly, for some perhaps
untruthful valuation. For this we introduce an activity rule that ensures that there is some
valuation function that is consistent with the revealed preference information implied by the
demand sets bid by a buyer in each iteration of the auction (we refer to such an activity rule
as revealed preference activity rule).
Let T = {1,...,T} be the set of iterations of the LVD auction till iteration T. Consider
a buyer i in the LVD auction. Let ˆ vi be a (integer valued) valuation function that satisﬁes
the following inequalities:
ˆ vi(j) − p
t′
(j) = ˆ vi(k) − p
t′
(k) ∀ j,k ∈ Di(p
t′
), ∀ t
′ ∈ T (C-I)
ˆ vi(j) − p
t′
(j) ≥ ˆ vi(k) − p
t′
(k) + 1 ∀ j ∈ Di(p
t′
), ∀ k / ∈ Di(p
t′
) ∀ t
′ ∈ T. (C-II)
A bidding strategy of buyer i is consistent until iteration T, if the system of equations
(C-I) and (C-II) has a feasible solution. The activity rule is deﬁned to ensure feasibility
and can be checked by validating these constraints in each iteration.10
Our main theorem for the LVD auction then follows from Theorem 2, along with the
equivalence between the minimum CE price vector and the VCG payments in the unit-
demand environment.
Theorem 3 Truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium in the LVD auction with the
revealed-preference activity rule and the auction is ex post eﬃcient.
The LVD auction may achieve a CE price vector before termination and has a price
trajectory that traverses through the CE price vector space to reach the minimum CE price
vector. This is illustrated in the next section. Losing buyers must continue to bid even
after the ﬁrst CE price vector has been identiﬁed, and thus after it is known to the auction
that the buyer is not a winner. We keep buyers ignorant of this by disclosing only the price
information in each iteration and withholding information about the provisional allocation
or demand sets. Vickrey’s remarks on implementing the Vickrey-Dutch auction for a single
item using the“ﬂash button”apparatus point to similar obfuscation.
10This check can be implemented with a linear program with O(Tn2) constraints. A simple, non-
computational activity rule does not appear to be possible in this auction because of the simple linear
prices adopted in the auction. Nevertheless, this activity rule can be made accessible to buyers by providing
a bid interface that explicitly restricts the demand sets that a buyer can submit in any iteration to those
consistent with previous reports.
163.4 An Example: Unit Demand
There are two buyers {1,2} and two items {1,2}. Valuations are: v11 = 8, v12 = 4, v21 =
6, v22 = 3. The starting price of the LVD auction is (9,9).
Iteration Price D1() D2() Provisional Universally
Allocations Allocated Items
0 (9,9) {0} {0} - ∅
1 (8,8) {0,1} {0} 1 → 1 ∅
2 (7,7) {1} {0} 1 → 1 ∅
3 (6,6) {1} {0,1} 1 → 1 {1}
4 (6,5) {1} {0,1} 1 → 1 {1}
5 (6,4) {1} {0,1} 1 → 1 {1}
6 (6,3) {1} {0,1,2} 1 → 1, 2 → 2 ∅
7 (5,2) {1} {1,2} 1 → 1, 2 → 2 ∅
8 (4,1) {1} {1,2} 1 → 1, 2 → 2 ∅
9 (3,0) {1} {1,2} 1 → 1, 2 → 2 {1,2}
A CE of the main economy is achieved in iteration 6 but this is not a UCE price vector.
In the ﬁnal iteration, item 2 is universally allocated since its price is zero and item 1 is
universally allocated since it can be allocated to buyer 2 in the absence of buyer 1. The ﬁnal
price vector (3,0) is the UCE price vector identiﬁed in Section 3. One can also observe that
both buyers are satisﬁed in every iteration and that the demand set of buyer 2 monotonically
increases while he is not allocated. Note, though, that the set of universally allocated items
is not monotonically increasing.
We plot the CE price vector space, price trajectory of the LVD auction, and price trajec-
tory of the Demange et al. (1986) (DGS) auction in Figure 2. It is interesting to note that
the price trajectory never touches the maximum CE price vector (pmax = (7,3)). We can
also see that the LVD auction price path travels through a signiﬁcant portion of the entire
CE price vector space before reaching the minimum CE price vector, whereas the ﬁrst CE
price vector in the DGS auction is the minimum CE price vector.
3.5 Remark: The Single-Item Special Case
When there is exactly one item for sale it is universally allocated when the number of buyers
demanding the item becomes more than one. Hence, the auction will allocate the item to
the ﬁrst buyer who demands it but terminates at a price for which the item is also demanded
by the buyer with the second-highest value. Clearly, this translates to the ﬂash-button
apparatus implementation described by Vickrey.
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Figure 2: Plot of price trajectory of the LVD auction and the DGS auction
4 The Homogeneous Items Environment with Decreas-
ing Marginal Values
In this section we introduce a Vickrey-Dutch auction for selling multiple units of a homoge-
neous item for buyers with marginal-decreasing values for each additional unit.
The auction maintains a single price rather than a vector of prices and provides a
descending-price analog to the ascending price“clinching”auction of Ausubel (2004): buyers
also clinch items in our auction and the ﬁnal payments are determined from demand infor-
mation revealed during the auction. The underlying philosophy of the design of this auction
remains the UCE price concept: all buyers are satisﬁed in the provisional allocation in every
iteration, and the auction eventually terminates with supply equal to demand in the main
economy as well as in every marginal economy.
In introducing the auction we ﬁrst provide a stylized clinching auction that is deﬁned
using a non-linear and non-anonymous price vector. This stylized version of the auction
makes the UCE framework clear and facilitates our analysis. Ultimately, we will show that
the auction can be implemented with the simple clinching auction, which maintains a price
on a single unit of the item in each iteration. This is price is best thought of as deﬁning the
current ask price for a marginal unit over and above the units already clinched by any buyer.
4.1 A Stylized Clinching Auction
By a slight abuse of notation, let n denote the number of units of the item for sale. Let
vi(j) denote the value of buyer i for j units of the item, assumed to be a non-negative
integer. Assume that vi(0) = 0 for every buyer and consider only non-increasing marginal
values (NIMV), so that vi(j) −vi(j − 1) ≥ vi(j + 1) − vi(j) for every buyer i and every unit
181 ≤ j < n.
For the stylized clinching auction, which is used for analysis only, let p ∈ R
m×(n+1)
+ denote
the non-anonymous and non-linear price maintained in each iteration. Let pi(j) denote the
price of buyer i for j units where 0 ≤ j ≤ n. Let Di(p) = {j ∈ {0,1,...,n} : vi(j) − pi(j) ≥
max0≤j′≤n vi(j′) − pi(j′)}. Let the maximal demand of buyer i at price vector p be Di(p),
deﬁned as the maximum number of units demanded. Allocation x, where xi denotes the
number of units allocated to buyer i, is a feasible allocation of economy E(M) for M ∈ B if P
i∈M xi ≤ n, and admissible if it is feasible and allocation xi ∈ Di(p)∪{0} for every i ∈ M.
A provisional allocation is an admissible allocation that maximizes the revenue to the seller
over all admissible allocations, breaking ties in favor of satisfying as many buyers as possible.
Given prices p, deﬁne α(M,p) := max(0,n−
P
i∈M Di(p)) and αi(p) := max
M∈B:i∈M
α(M,p).
Quantity α(M,p) denotes the under-demand in economy E(M) while αi(p) denotes the
under-demand for buyer i, i.e. the minimal number of additional units that buyer i needs to
demand for demand to meet supply in every economy in which he is present.
Deﬁnition 6 The (stylized) clinching Vickrey-Dutch (CVD) auction is deﬁned as:
(S0) Initialize prices as p0
i(j) = q0j for all i ∈ B and for all j ≤ n, where q0 is a high
integer. Set t := 0.
(S1) In iteration t of the auction with price vector pt:
(S1.1) Collect the demand sets D(pt) of all the buyers at pt. Impose Di(pt) ≥ Di(pt−1)
for every buyer i ∈ B if t > 0.
(S1.2) Based on the demand sets of buyers at pt, calculate the under-demand αi(pt) for
every buyer.
(S1.3) If αi(pt) = 0 for every buyer or qt = 0 then go to Step (S2). Else, qt+1 := qt − 1
and for every i with αi(pt) > 0, set
p
t+1
i (j) :=
￿
pt
i(j) for all j ≤ Di(pt)
pt
i(Di(pt)) + qt+1(j − Di(pt)) , otherwise.
Set t := t + 1 and repeat from Step (S1).
(S2) The auction terminates in current iteration T with price vector pT. Final allocation
is xT ∈ X(D(pT)), and for each buyer i ∈ B with xT
i > 0, his payment is pT
i (xT
i ) − h
πs(pT) − πs(pT
−i)
i
.
The auction includes a simple activity rule in Step S1.1, which requires that maximal
demand should not decrease across iterations (we also require that no buyer has maximal
demand more than zero in the ﬁrst iteration). The only feedback provided to each buyer
in each iteration is the current price vector pt
i. While there is under-demand for buyer i,
19then parameter qt represents the ask price in round t on each marginal unit over and above
the current number of items demanded by the buyer. The auction terminates when this
marginal price is zero, or when there is no under-demand for any buyer. The price vector
faced by buyer i in round t is deﬁned recursively in terms of the price in the previous round
but adjusted downwards on numbers of units greater than its current demand. The payment
is ﬁnally determined as a discount from the prices at the end of the auction.
It is useful to deﬁne the provisional allocation that is associated with each iteration of
the auction, even though this is not explicit in the auction rules. For this purpose, let
xt
M ∈ X(DM(pt)) denote the provisional allocation for economy E(M). We will show that
provisional allocation, xt
M, satisﬁes every buyer in every economy E(M) in every iteration,
and that upon termination these provisional allocations are also in the supply set for the
seller in every economy. Thus we have UCE prices. This resembles our analysis for the LVD
auction.
We ﬁrst make the following observations. These are made for a variant on CVD without
the activity rule in Step (S1.1) of the auction (and serve in part to show that the activity
rule does not constrain a truthful bidding strategy):
Lemma 3 Suppose every buyer follows truthful bidding strategy, and consider the stylized
CVD auction without the activity rule in Step (S1.1). Then, in every iteration t ≥ 0 of this
auction in the homogeneous items NIMV environment, we have (a) Di(pt+1) ≥ Di(pt), (b)
Di(pt) = {0,1,...,Di(pt)}, and (c) vi(j) − vi(j − 1) ≤ pt
i(j) − pt
i(j − 1) for all 0 < j ≤ n,
for all buyers i ∈ B.
Proof: Consider any buyer i ∈ B. The base case for t = 0 is easy because the prices are
initially high and Di(p0) = 0 (and thus Di(p1) ≥ Di(p0)), Di(p0) = {0,...,Di(p0)} and
vi(j)−vi(j−1) ≤ q0 for all 0 < j ≤ n. For iteration t > 0, consider the interesting case that
Di(pt−1) < n. Otherwise the prices are unchanged. By the inductive hypothesis (b) and the
price change rule, we have vi(j)−vi(j −1) = p
t−1
i (j)−p
t−1
i (j −1) = pt
i(j)−pt
i(j −1) for all
0 < j ≤ Di(pt−1), and vi(Di(pt−1)+1)−vi(Di(pt−1)) < p
t−1
i (D(pt−1)+1)−p
t−1
i (D(pt−1)) =
qt−1. By NIMV, vi(j)−vi(j −1) ≤ vi(Di(pt−1)+1)−vi(Di(pt−1)) < pt−1(j)−pt−1(j −1) =
qt−1 = qt + 1 for all Di(pt−1) < j ≤ n by NIMV. This implies that vi(j) − vi(j − 1) ≤ qt =
pt
i(j) − pt
i(j) for all Di(pt−1) < j ≤ n, where the last equality follows from the price change
rule. This establishes inductive hypothesis (c) for iteration t. Property (a) is true since
Di(pt) ≥ Di(pt−1), and the price on marginal unit Di(pt−1)+1 falls while the price on all units
≤ Di(pt−1) is unchanged. Finally, for inductive hypothesis (b), assume j ∈ Di(pt). If j > 0,
then we will show that j −1 ∈ Di(pt). Since j ∈ Di(pt), vi(j)−vi(j −1) ≥ pt
i(j)−pt
i(j −1).
From (c), which was proved earlier, we have vi(j) − vi(j − 1) ≤ pt
i(j) − pt
i(j − 1). Together,
it gives vi(j)−vi(j −1) = pt
i(j)−pt
i(j −1). This implies j −1 ∈ Di(pt). Hence (b) holds. ￿
A consequence of Lemma 3 is that when every buyer bids truthfully in the auction, then
qt = 0 in some iteration t implies that αi(pt) = 0 for all i ∈ B (this is because of non-negative
marginal values).
20Deﬁne the marginal price of the (j + 1)st unit (0 ≤ j < n) for buyer i, given price pt in
iteration t, as pt
i(j + 1) − pt
i(j). The role of qt in the auction deﬁnition is to capture this
marginal price, and the marginal price on the (j + 1)st unit for j ≥ Di(pt) is exactly qt, for
every buyer and in every iteration.
Lemma 4 In every iteration of the auction and for every buyer, the marginal price of jth
unit is less than or equal to the marginal price of (j +1)st unit for 0 ≤ j ≤ n−1. Moreover,
all buyers face the same marginal price on each unit for all units j greater than the maximal
demand of the buyer in that iteration.
Proof: By deﬁnition of the auction, for j greater than or equal to the maximal demand of
a buyer, the marginal price of (j + 1)st unit for that buyer is qt in iteration t. The prices
of units less than maximal demand are not changed. By the activity rule in Step (S1.1),
the maximal demand of every buyer is non-decreasing from iteration to iteration (starting
at zero in iteration 0). Hence, the marginal price of jth unit is less than or equal to the
marginal price of (j + 1)st unit for 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. ￿
Proposition 5 Suppose every buyer follows the truthful bidding strategy and α(M,pt) = 0
for economy E(M) for some M ∈ B in iteration t of the stylized CVD auction in the
homogeneous items NIMV environment. Then the provisional allocation x of economy E(M)
is in the supply set of the seller in that economy in iteration t.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that x is not in the supply set of the seller in economy
E(M) in iteration t. By deﬁnition, x maximizes revenue of the seller across all admissible
allocations of economy E(M) in iteration t. This means no allocation in the supply set of
the seller is an admissible allocation in economy E(M) (if there are allocations in the supply
set that are admissible then one of them must be selected, because they satisfy more buyers
than an allocation that is not admissible). Consider some allocation y in the supply set of
the seller in economy E(M) in iteration t. Since y is not admissible, and by Lemma 3 (which
says that zero is in demand set of every buyer throughout the auction), there is some buyer
i ∈ M such that yi > Di(pt). Since α(M,pt) = 0, there exists k  = i such that yk < Dk(pt).
Now, construct a new allocation z of economy E(M) such that zi = yi −1, zk = yk + 1, and
zi′ = yi′ for all i′ ∈ M \ {i,k}. From Lemma 4, the revenue from z is greater than or equal
to the revenue from y because because the marginal price of a unit less than the maximal
demand of a buyer is greater than the marginal price of a unit greater than maximal demand.
This process of constructing a new allocation can be repeated till we get an allocation z such
that zi ≤ Di(pt) for all i ∈ M. Thus, we get an admissible allocation of economy E(M) with
revenue greater than or equal to the revenue from y. This is a contradiction. ￿
These results lead to the main result of this section.
21Proposition 6 Suppose every buyer follows the truthful bidding strategy. Then the stylized
CVD auction terminates at a UCE price vector in the homogeneous items NIMV environ-
ment.
Proof: Since buyers are truthful, the maximal demand of all the buyers will be n when the
marginal price reaches zero. Thus, the zero marginal price provides a lower bound for the
prices in the auction and it will terminate after a ﬁnite number of iterations. There exists a
provisional allocation of economy E(M), in every M ∈ B, for which every buyer is satisﬁed
in every iteration t. This is easy to see: every provisional allocation allocates every buyer
either zero units or the number of units requested in his demand set. By Lemma 3, receiving
zero units is in the demand set of every buyer in every iteration. Then, upon termination
we will have
P
i∈M Di(pT) ≥ n for all M ∈ B, and thus the provisional allocation in every
economy E(M) is in the supply set of the seller by Proposition 5. Thus, pT is a UCE price
vector. ￿
4.2 A Simpler Representation of the CVD Auction: Clinching
We now present a simpler representation of the stylized CVD auction that only maintains
the marginal price, qt, in each iteration and makes the clinching behavior of the CVD auction
explicit. We call it the simple-CVD auction. The analysis re-parameterizes the demand sets
and under-demand in terms of this marginal price. The simpliﬁed auction design follows
from the following observations:
• By Lemma 3, a buyer can report his entire demand set by revealing only his maximal
demand in each iteration. Since qt is the marginal price of a unit, the maximal demand
given qt is:
Di(q
t) =
(
0 , if vi(1) − vi(0) < qt
max
j∈{0,1,...,n}
j s.t. vi(j) − vi(j − 1) ≥ qt , otherwise.
• The maximal demand reported by buyers across all rounds can be used to determine
the provisional allocation in each economy E(M). This is important because it is not
possible to ﬁnd the provisional allocation from just the maximal demands reported by
buyers in the current iteration. Consider economy E(M) and iteration t. If α(M,qt) >
0 then deﬁne the provisional allocation by assigning Di(qt) to each buyer i ∈ M. In
the ﬁrst period t in which α(M,qt) = 0, allocate Di(qt−1) to each buyer i ∈ M and
complete the allocation by assigning additional units (i.e., n−
P
i∈M Di(qt)) to buyers
at random such that no buyers gets more than his maximal demand in iteration t. We
refer to this allocation as a sequential allocation.
• The ﬁnal payments must also be determined from the demand sets reported by buyers
across iterations. Let tm denote the ﬁrst iteration in which
P
i∈B xt
i ≥ n, and thus
22for which α(B,qt) = 0. Deﬁne the residual demand without buyer i as r−i(qt) =
min(xi,
P
j =i[Dj(qt) − xj]) for all iterations t ≥ tm. For iterations t < tm, deﬁne
r−i(qt) = 0 for all i ∈ B. For iterations t ≥ tm, the residual demand without i deﬁnes
the amount of the supply that is allocated to buyer i in the main economy that is
also demanded (in aggregate) by other buyers. The change in residual demand from
iteration to iteration, from tm till termination also provides enough information to
deﬁne the ﬁnal payments of each buyer (see Lemma 5).
• By deﬁnition, in iterations t ≥ tm, α(B−i,qt) = 0 if and only if r−i(qt) = xt
i, for all
buyers i ∈ B. Thus, the residual demand information also provides a termination
condition: the CVD auction terminates if and only if t ≥ tm and either ri(qt) = xt for
all i, or qt = 0 (under truthful bidding, we do not need to check for qt = 0).
Lemma 5 Suppose every buyer follows a truthful bidding strategy in the homogeneous items
NIMV environment, then the ﬁnal payment of buyer i is equal to
P
t≥tm
h
qt ∗ (r−i(qt) −
r−i(qt−1))
i
.
Proof: Let pT be the ﬁnal price vector in the stylized CVD auction. Let x and y be
eﬃcient allocations of the main economy and the marginal economy corresponding to buyer
i respectively. The VCG payment of buyer i when all buyers are truthful is:
p
vcg
i = vi(xi) −
X
k∈B
vk(xk) +
X
k∈B−i
vk(yk)
=
X
k∈B−i
[vk(yk) − vk(xk)] =
X
k∈B−i
[p
T
k(yk) − p
T
k(xk)] (From Lemma 3)
The above expression for the VCG payment of buyer i can be rewritten as
p
vcg
i =
X
k =i
h
[p
T
k(yk) − p
T
k(yk − 1)] + ... + [p
T
k(xk + 1) − p
T
k(xk)]
i
(1)
For any k ∈ B−i and for any j ∈ {xk,...,yk − 1}, the marginal price of (j + 1)st unit in
the ﬁnal iteration, pT
k(j + 1) − pT
k(j), is the marginal price of (j + 1)st unit in the iteration
in which the maximal demand of k increased from j to j + 1. Since every buyer sees the
same marginal price in any iteration of our auction, we can monitor the change in maximal
demand of all buyers in B−i simultaneously in every iteration after iteration tm to compute
the VCG payment of buyer i. The change in residual demand without buyer i in an iteration
t ≥ tm reﬂects the total change in maximal demand of buyers in B−i. The price of these
units get ﬁxed after this. Hence qt ∗ (r−i(qt) − r−i(qt−1)) is the price component of buyer i
for r−i(qt) − r−i(qt−1) units in Equation 1. Adding over all the iterations after iteration tm
gives the VCG payment of buyer i, i.e., p
vcg
i =
P
t≥tm qt ∗ (r−i(qt) − r−i(qt−1)). ￿
We can now deﬁne the simple clinching auction for the multiple, homogeneous items
environment.
23Deﬁnition 7 The simple-CVD auction is an iterative procedure with the following steps:
(S0) Start from a high price q0. Set t := 0. Set the total number of units clinched by
buyers, (c1,...,cm), to zero. Set the total payments of buyers, (s1,...,sm), to zero.
(S1) In iteration t of the auction with price qt:
(S1.1) Collect maximal demand Di(qt) of every buyer i at price qt. Impose Di(qt) ≥
Di(qt−1) for every buyer for all t > 0.
(S1.2) If
P
i∈B Di(qt) < n then ci = Di(qt) for all i ∈ B. Set qt+1 := qt − 1, t := t + 1,
and repeat from Step (S1.1).
(S1.3) If
P
i∈B Di(qt) ≥ n and
P
i∈B Di(qt−1) < n, then set tm := t and set c to be any
sequential allocation.
(S1.4) Set si := si + qt ∗ (r−i(qt) − r−i(qt−1)) for all i ∈ B.
(S1.5) If r−i(qt) = ci for all i ∈ B or qt = 0, then go to Step (S2). Else, set qt+1 := qt−1,
t := t + 1, and repeat from Step (S1.1).
(S2) Final allocation is (c1,...,cm) and the ﬁnal payment vector is (s1,...,sm).
The simple-CVD auction maintains the marginal price of an additional unit over and
above the clinched units and lowers it in every iteration. Buyers clinch all units they currently
demand while the total demand is less than the total number of units. In the ﬁrst period in
which the total demand exceeds supply, then a sequential allocation (deﬁned above) is used
to determine the clinched units. The clinched units of a buyer are priced by monitoring the
residual demand in the marginal economy corresponding to that buyer. The auction stops
when all the clinched units of the buyers are priced and occurs exactly when the residual
demand without each buyer equals the number of units clinched by that buyer, and thus
exactly when supply equals demand in every economy. The computational requirements of
this auction are very light: simple linear time operations are performed in every iteration.
The activity rule, which requires that maximal demand weakly increases during the
auction is analogous to the activity rule in Ausubel’s ascending price auction (Ausubel,
2004) where the demand of each buyer must weakly decrease from iteration to iteration. As
a consequence of the activity rule, we have the following result.
Lemma 6 Any strategy available to any buyer in the simple-CVD auction under the activity
rule is equivalent to some straightforward bidding strategy in the homogeneous items NIMV
environment.
Proof: Consider a buyer i ∈ B. Now, consider the following valuation function ˆ vi for buyer
i: ˆ vi(0) = 0, ˆ vi(j)−ˆ vi(j −1) = qt, if the maximal demand of buyer i is greater than or equal
to j units for the ﬁrst time in the simple-CVD auction in iteration t, and ˆ vi(j)−ˆ vi(j−1) = 0
if the maximal demand of buyer i is less than j units in every iteration of the simple-CVD
24auction. From the activity rule, ˆ vi must satisfy NIMV because the marginal price is non-
increasing in the simple-CVD auction. So, any strategy of any buyer can be mapped to a
straightforward bidding strategy with respect to some NIMV valuation. ￿
Using Theorem 2 with Proposition 6 and Lemma 6 gives us our main result for the CVD
auction:
Theorem 4 Truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium strategy in the simple-CVD
auction under the activity rule and the auction is ex post eﬃcient in the homogeneous items
NIMV environment.
4.3 An Example: Homogeneous Items
j 1 2 3 4
v1(j) 7 9 10 10
v2(j) 8 13 15 15
v3(j) 4 8 10 10
Table 1: An example with 4 units of a homogeneous item and 3 buyers, each with non-
increasing marginal values. The values in the table provide the total value of each buyer for
some number of units of the item. The eﬃcient allocation is depicted in bold.
Consider the simple example in Table 1. The price adjustment in the stylized CVD
auction and in the simple CVD auction is shown in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.
The ﬁrst column in Table 2 indicates the iteration number, the next three columns
indicate the personalized prices of each buyer for each number of units, and the last column
indicates the excess supply in economy E(M) for every M ∈ B. Parentheses around prices
for a buyer indicate which quantity of units are in the demand set of a buyer in each iteration.
The ﬁnal price vector in the auction is a UCE price vector. Also, πs(B) = 24, πs(B−1) = 21,
πs(B−2) = 17, πs(B−3) = 22. Using discounts from UCE price as in Eq. (1), the payment of
buyer 1 can be calculated as p
vcg
1 = p1(1)−[πs(B)−πs(B−1)] = 7−[24−21] = 4. Similarly,
p
vcg
2 = 13 − [24 − 17] = 6, p
vcg
3 = 4 − [24 − 22] = 2. It is a simple matter to check that these
are indeed the VCG payments in this example.
We illustrate the steps of the simple-CVD auction in Table 3. Buyers clinch units as soon
as they demand them while there is available supply. For instance, in iteration 2, buyer 2
demands a unit and clinches it as there are 4 units of supply available in the main economy
(and no other demand). In iteration 6 the total demand in economy E(B−1) is 4 units and
buyers in B−1 have clinched 3 units. This means there is a residual demand of 1 unit in the
economy and the single unit clinched by buyer 1 is priced at the current price, which is 4.
Similarly, the total demand in economy E(B−2) is 3 units and buyers in B−2 have clinched
2 units, creating a residual demand of 1 unit. Thus, only one of the two units clinched by
25# qt Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 α( )
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 B B−1 B−2 B−3
1 9 9 18 27 36 9 18 27 36 9 18 27 36 4 4 4 4
2 8 8 16 24 32 (8) 16 24 32 8 16 24 32 3 3 4 3
3 7 (7) 14 21 28 (8) 15 22 29 7 14 21 28 2 3 3 2
4 6 (7) 13 19 25 (8) 14 20 26 6 12 18 24 2 3 3 2
5 5 (7) 12 17 22 (8) (13) 18 23 5 10 15 20 1 2 3 1
From iteration 6 onwards, we have a CE of the main economy.
6 4 (7) 11 15 19 (8) (13) 17 21 (4) (8) 12 16 0 0 1 0
7 3 (7) 10 13 16 (8) (13) 17 20 (4) (8) 11 14 0 0 1 0
8 2 (7) (9) 11 13 (8) (13) 17 19 (4) (8) (10) 12 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Non-linear and non-anonymous price trajectory in the stylized CVD auction
buyer 2 can be priced at the current price of 4. The next change in residual demand occurs
in iteration 8, when the remaining units are priced, and the auction terminates.
Price Demand Units clinched Residual demand Payments
t qt κt
1 κt
2 κt
3 c1 c2 c3 rt
1 rt
2 rt
3 s1 s2 s3
1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 8 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 7 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 6 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 5 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
From iteration 6 onwards, we have a CE of the main economy.
6 4 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 4 4 0
7 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 4 4 0
8 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 4 4+2 2
Table 3: Marginal price trajectory in the simple-CVD auction
4.4 Remark: Relating to LVD and the Unit-Demand Special Case
Due to the homogeneous nature of items in this setting it is diﬃcult to give a direct analogy
to the notion of a universally allocated item, as deﬁned for the unit demand setting. But
the idea of pricing a unit when the residual demand of a buyer increases is similar to the
idea of pricing a unit when it can still be allocated in the absence of that buyer. Moreover,
the prices in our auction are decreased until all units are allocated in all economies, which
mirrors the termination condition in the LVD auction.
Consider now the special case of unit-demand preferences with multiple units of a homo-
geneous item, so that each buyer demands a single unit of the item. This satisﬁes the NIMV
26requirement because the marginal value of kth unit with k > 1 is zero. In the unit-demand
setting, the maximal demand of all the buyers never exceed one (except for the trivial case
when qt is zero). A buyer is awarded a unit as soon as he demands it. So, the number
of clinched units of a buyer does not exceed one (as long as qt > 0). Hence, the residual
demand of a buyer cannot exceed one. The residual demand of every buyer who has clinched
a unit becomes equal to one when the number of buyers demanding a unit becomes greater
than the number of units. In that iteration, all the buyers are priced - the payment of every
buyer (who has clinched a unit) is the marginal price in that iteration. Notice that (a) the
terminating condition in this case requires all units to be allocated in an economy without
a buyer, which is equivalent to the universally allocated item condition of the LVD auction;
(b) The CVD auction translates to the well known uniform second-price auction for multi-
ple units, where buyers pay the (same) price of the highest losing buyer. Thus, the CVD
auction translates to a simpler representation of the LVD auction in the homogeneous item
unit demand setting. When there is exactly one unit for auction (i.e., n = 1), the auction
stops as soon as a second buyer demands the unit, translating to the Vickrey’s ﬂash-button
apparatus.
5 An Experimental Analysis of Speed and Preference
Elicitation
In this section, we compare the speed and preference elicitation properties of our auctions
with their ascending price counterparts. Our analysis is based on computer simulations. For
speed, our metric for comparison is the number of iterations in the auction. For preference
elicitation, we deﬁne a new metric (the uncertainty index), which provides a measure of the
accuracy with which agent valuations are revealed to the auction.
In our computer simulations the input parameters are the number of buyers, the number
of items (or units), and the density. In the unit-demand setting the density is a real number
between 0 and 1, and reﬂects the probability with which a buyer will have positive value
on an item: a higher density means that more buyers have positive value on items. In the
homogeneous item setting, a higher density reﬂects a higher probability that a buyer has
positive marginal value for a unit. All values are integers and the bid decrement in both
auctions is set to one throughout. All the results are averaged over 100 trials.
275.1 The LVD Auction: Unit Demand
We simulate the LVD auction and the DGS auction11 using a computer program. Valuations
of buyers for items are drawn from a uniform distribution with range [0,100] and assigned
according to the density. The starting price on every item in the LVD auction is 100 (the
upper limit of valuation) and zero in the DGS auction (the lower limit of valuation). Thus,
this is completely symmetric for the two diﬀerent auctions. Before presenting the simulation
results, we propose a novel way of measuring preference elicitation in iterative auctions.12
5.1.1 A Preference Elicitation Measure
We propose a metric that measures the amount of revealed preference information that is
implied by the bids placed by buyers in response to increasing or decreasing prices. In the
equilibrium of both the DGS and the LVD auctions, the demand set reported by a buyer in
a round implies constraints on an agent’s valuation. These constraints are those deﬁned in
Section 3.3 in the context of the revealed preference activity rule, i.e. constraints (C-I) and
(C-II). Following the language introduced there, the set of feasible valuations for a buyer
is the set of consistent valuations; i.e., those valuations that are consistent with the demand
sets submitted across the sequence of iterations. The size of the set of consistent valuations
indicates the amount of information revealed: a large set corresponds with considerable
uncertainty about valuations and a small set corresponding to little uncertainty.
The consistent valuations in the LVD and DGS auctions form a lattice, the structure of
which leads to a natural metric.13
Theorem 5 Suppose the valuation of every buyer is drawn from a distribution with ﬁnite
support. Then the set of consistent valuations of every buyer in the LVD auction and the
DGS auction forms a complete lattice.
Proof: Let v1
i and v2
i be two consistent valuations of buyer i in the LVD auction. Deﬁne
v3
i := min(v1
i,v2
i) and v4
i := max(v1
i,v2
i). Consider an iteration t of the LVD auction. We will
show that v3
i satisﬁes Equations (C-I) and (C-II). Consider j ∈ Di(pt). Suppose v3
ij = v1
ij.
Consider the case when k ∈ Di(pt). If v3
ik = v1
ik, then v3
ij − v3
ik = v1
ij − v1
ik = pt
j − pt
k. Else,
v1
ik > v2
ik. This gives, v1
ij − v1
ik < v2
ij − v2
ik. But, v1
ij − v1
ik = v2
ij − v2
ik = pt
j − pt
k. This gives a
11The ascending price auction in Demange et al. (1986) has been modiﬁed in Sankaran (1994). This
modiﬁcation has a computationally faster price adjustment procedure than the original ascending price
auction of Demange et al. (1986), and is suitable for practical implementation. We refer to the auction of
Demange et al. (1986), as modiﬁed by Sankaran (1994), as the DGS auction.
12See (Parkes and Kalagnanam, 2005) for a related, but diﬀerent, approach in which the probability mass
that is consistent with the revealed information is adopted as a metric of the remaining uncertainty about
preferences.
13Given two consistent valuations v1
i and v2
i of buyer i, we say that the set of consistent valuations of
buyer i form a lattice if min(v1
i ,v2
i) and max(v1
i ,v2
i) are also consistent valuations of buyer i. Here, for any
two vectors x1 and x2, min(x1,x2) is deﬁned as by taking minimum of every component of x1 and x2, and
similarly max(x1,x2) is deﬁned.
28contradiction, implying that v3
ik = v1
ik and v3
ij − v3
ik = v1
ij − v1
ik = pt
j − pt
k. Now, consider the
case when k / ∈ Di(pt). Suppose v3
ij = v1
ij. v3
ij − v3
ik = v1
ij − v3
ik ≥ v1
ij − v1
ik = pt
j − pt
k. Thus,
Equations (C-I) and (C-II) are satisﬁed by valuation function v3
i . So, v3
i is a consistent
valuation. Similar arguments show that v4
i is a consistent valuation. This shows that the set
of consistent valuations is a lattice in the LVD auction. A similar proof follows for the DGS
auction. Since the valuations are drawn from a distribution with ﬁnite support, this lattice
is complete. ￿
The previous theorem says that for every buyer i there exists a unique greatest consistent
valuation, vmax
i , and a unique least consistent valuation, vmin
i . We deﬁne the uncertainty
index UI i for buyer i (in both the LVD and the DGS auction) as:
UI i =
X
j∈Ai
h
vmax
ij − vmin
ij
i
100 × |Ai|
, (2)
where Ai = {j ∈ A : vij > 0}. The uncertainty index for buyer i is the sum of remaining
uncertainty (in terms of the diﬀerence between the greatest and smallest consistent values)
about the buyer’s valuation on items for which it has non-zero value. We normalize this by
the size of the domain of distribution from which the valuations are drawn (here, it is 100-
0=100) and the number of items on which it has non-zero value. We choose not to consider
the residual uncertainty on items for which a buyer’s value is zero because we think of the
preference information on these items as easy for buyers to report: it is easy to identify items
for which a buyer has no value but hard for a buyer to determine its exact value for other
items.14
The uncertainty index (UI) of an auction is the average of uncertainty indices of all the
buyers, averaged in turn over a number of instances.15 Note that the UI index captures the
amount of (costly) preference elicitation not elicited from the buyers and thus a large UI
index is better than a small UI index.
14The results that we present are qualitatively unchanged if the uncertainty index is deﬁned as the average
residual value uncertainty across all items.
15To illustrate the idea of UI, we give an example of auctioning of a single item. Suppose there are
four buyers with values 10,8,6, and 4 respectively, drawn from a uniform distribution with range [0,10].
Suppose the starting price in the Vickrey-Dutch auction is 10 and that in the English auction is 0. Both the
Vickrey-Dutch auction and the English auction will terminate at price 8. All buyers except the ﬁrst buyer
will reveal their valuations in the English auction, whereas the ﬁnal price gives a lower bound of 9 on the
valuation of the ﬁrst buyer. So, the least consistent valuation proﬁle and the greatest consistent valuation
proﬁle in the English auction are (9,8,6,4) and (10,8,6,4) respectively, and the UI is the average of UI of
all the buyers, i.e., 1+0+0+0
4×10 = 0.025. In the Vickrey-Dutch auction, the ﬁrst and second buyers reveal their
valuations. The ﬁnal price gives an upper bound of 7 on the valuations of the third and fourth buyers. So, the
greatest consistent valuation proﬁle and the least consistent valuation proﬁle in the Vickrey-Dutch auction
are (10,8,7,7) and (10,8,0,0) respectively. So, the UI of the Vickrey-Dutch auction is 0+0+7+7
4×10 = 0.35.
295.1.2 Simulation Results
We ﬁx the number of items at 5, the density at 0.75 (i.e. on average, every buyer has
has non-zero value for 75% of the items), and vary the number of buyers from 5 to 50. A
comparison of the speed of the LVD auction and the DGS auction is shown in Figure 3(a),
while a comparison of preference elicitation (using the uncertainty index) is shown in Figure
3(b). We also plot the average market clearing price, which is deﬁned as the ratio between
the total payments made by the bidders and the total number of items in the market. The
clearing price is a useful proxy for the overall level of competition in the market as we vary
the number of buyers. The clearing price is normalized by dividing it over 100 for Figure
3(b), in order to include this alongside a plot of UI.
In both the ﬁgures, we see that when the number of buyers are relatively low (less than
8), the DGS auction has better speed and preference elicitation properties. As the number
of buyers increase, the LVD auction does better in terms of both speed and preference
elicitation. It is nice to observe that the cross-over point, beyond which the LVD auction
dominates the DGS auction, occurs for prices around 50 which is the median of the domain
of values on items (0,100) in this environment (note that 0 and 100 also represent the initial
prices in the DGS and LVD auctions respectively).16
In terms of the average uncertainty index, it is notable that the LVD auction is able to
achieve approaching 90% UI for a large number of buyers. Roughly, this number indicates
the average remaining value uncertainty on items for which agents have non-zero value at
the end of the auction. This is a signiﬁcant improvement over the UI of the DGS auction
for a large range of the number of buyers.17
We see these trends in other environments also. We experimented in two other environ-
ments: (a) ﬁx the density and the number of buyers, and vary the number of items; (b) ﬁx
the number of buyers and the number of items, and vary the density. In both these environ-
ments, we see very similar eﬀects: at high average market clearing prices the LVD auction
does better than the DGS auction but at low market clearing prices the DGS auction does
better than the LVD auction. The cross-over point occurs consistently around an average
clearing price of 50.
5.2 The Clinching Vickrey Dutch Auction: Homogeneous Items
Turning to the environment with multiple units of a homogeneous item we deﬁne a distri-
bution on NIMV valuations. The marginal value of the ﬁrst unit is drawn uniformly from
16Indeed, the number of iterations in the DGS auction tracks the clearing price while the number of
iterations in the LVD auction tracks 100 minus the clearing price.
17One surprising observation from this simulation is that although the UI for the DGS auction initially
decreases with the number of buyers, it is approximately steady (and even slightly improving) as the number
of buyers increases from 10 towards 50. We expect that this results from two factors: (a) the number of
iterations in DGS is fairly constant (and large) on this range; (b) as the clearing prices become higher on
this range more buyers are“priced-out”and stop revealing information.
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Figure 3: The speed and average uncertainty index in the LVD and the DGS auctions for
unit-demand valuations.
the integers on the range [50,100]. For buyer i and k > 1, if ˆ v
k−1
i is the marginal value of
the (k − 1)st unit, then the marginal value of the kth unit is drawn uniformly from integers
in the range [
ˆ v
k−1
i
2 ,ˆ v
k−1
i ] with probability equal to density, where density is an input to our
simulations. With probability equal to (1-density), we set the marginal value of kth (k > 1)
unit of buyer i at zero (and zero value on future units as well).
Before presenting the simulation results, we describe how we measure preference elicita-
31tion in this setting. The revealed preference information implicit in the demand sets in the
equilibrium of the CVD and AUS auctions in this environment provides information about
the marginal value on each unit but not necessarily the absolute value. This is because the
prices in these auctions deﬁne the price on a marginal unit relative to the number of units
already clinched. For this reason, the uncertainty index (UI) is deﬁned here in terms of infor-
mation about the marginal valuations, but is otherwise unchanged: we measure the diﬀerence
between the greatest consistent marginal valuation and the least consistent marginal valua-
tion (normalized by dividing it over 100, and considering only those units whose marginal
value is non-zero).18
5.2.1 Simulation Results
We ﬁx the number of units at 20, the density at 0.75, and vary the number of buyers from 5
to 50. The plots for speed and for preference elicitation are shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b).
We continue to include the average market clearing price, deﬁned here the total payment
made by the bidders divided by the number of units, and again normalized by dividing by
100 in the preference elicitation plot.
We again see an excellent match between the average clearing price and the number of
iterations, with the CVD auction converging more quickly than AUS for around 15 or more
buyers, corresponding again to average clearing price of 50. The descending auction also
enjoys better preference elicitation properties than the ascending auction for a large number
of buyers, with the cross-over again occurring at around 15 buyers and a clearing price of
around 50. In this simulation the UI of the AUS auction continues to worsen as the number of
buyers increases, apparently trending towards 100% elicitation for a large number of buyers.
The preference elicitation properties of the CVD auction are signiﬁcantly better than the
AUS auction in this environment for a moderate to large number of buyers.
We again conducted our simulations for two other environments: (a) ﬁxing the density and
the number of buyers, and varying the number of units; (b) ﬁxing the number of items and
the number of buyers, and varying the density. In both these environments, we found similar
conclusions: at higher market clearing prices the CVD auction performs better than the AUS
auction in terms of both speed and preference elicitation, with the cross-over occurring at
an average market price of around 50.
6 Conclusions
We proposed ex post eﬃcient Vickrey-Dutch auctions for environments with unit demand and
with multiple homogeneous items and non-decreasing marginal values. These Vickrey-Dutch
auctions are designed within the framework of universal competitive equilibrium prices. The
18The consistent marginal valuations form a lattice in both auctions. This can be veriﬁed along the lines
of proof of Theorem 5, and is omitted in the interest of space.
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Figure 4: The average number of iterations to termination and preference elicitation in the
CVD and the AUS auctions for NIMV and homogeneous items.
Vickrey-Dutch auctions in both settings maintain simple prices, which along with their pref-
erence elicitation properties and speed, especially in environments with high competition,
appears to make them very attractive for practical use in private value settings.
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